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Indian Givers: What Indigenous Peoples Have 
Contributed to International Human Rights Law† 
S. James Anaya* 
The interests of Native Americans have long been ignored, or 
worse. The history of misdealing and atrocities committed against 
Native Americans ever since Christopher Columbus found himself on 
a Caribbean island, miscalculated his location, and called his hosts 
“Indians” is well known. Much less widely known are the present day 
legacies of this sad history. The American myth of the “vanishing 
savage,” a myth created to embolden white settlement of the country, 
has only partially been embraced by reality. Although vastly reduced 
in numbers, and concentrated in pockets of relative geographic 
isolation called reservations, the country’s indigenous peoples are 
still here.  
For the country’s indigenous peoples, historical acts of oppression 
are not just blemishes of the past but rather translate into current 
inequities. Like other indigenous peoples around the world, Native 
Americans have been deprived of vast landholdings and access to 
life-sustaining resources and they have suffered historical forces that 
have actively suppressed their political and cultural institutions. As a 
result, indigenous peoples have been crippled economically and 
socially, their cohesiveness as communities has been damaged or 
threatened, and the integrity of their cultures has been undermined. 
According to every measure, Native Americans as a whole are at the 
lowest rung of the socio-economic ladder and they exist at the 
margins of political power. 
 
 † This paper was prepared from a speech given at Washington University in St. Louis 
School of Law as part of the Public Interest Law Speakers Series. Minimal footnotes have been 
added by the author. 
 * James J. Lenoir Professor of Human Rights Law and Policy, University of Arizona 
Rogers College of Law.  
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Nevertheless, in the face of tremendous adversity, indigenous 
peoples have long sought not just to survive physically but to flourish 
as distinct communities on their ancestral territories. They have 
endeavored to roll back the inequities that linger from the experiences 
of the past. This “blood struggle,” as Charles Wilkinson calls it, is 
one that draws its major source of strength from the remarkable 
resilience of Native Americans and the cultural and social patterns 
that bind them into communities.1 Drawing on this strength, Native 
Americans have employed a number of strategies, including those 
that enlist the law and the legal process, as agents of change. The 
limitations of the United States’ legal order, however, have all too 
often become apparent. Within the architecture of the domestic legal 
order doctrines derived from colonial era practice continue to rear 
their heads and impede the reversal of the status quo left by the 
colonizing process. 
Faced with legal and political barriers in the United States, Native 
Americans, like indigenous peoples elsewhere, have extended their 
legal advocacy into the international arena. Over the last three 
decades especially, they have been appealing to the international 
community and looking to international law to advance their claims. 
However, international law has its own set of limitations. 
International law is a body of transnational rules and procedures, 
linked to international institutions, in which states are the primary 
actors. Historically, international law can be seen as complicit in 
patterns of colonization, ultimately upholding the sovereignty 
asserted by colonizing states over indigenous peoples and their lands. 
But things change. 
A good deal of scholarly energy has gone into examining the 
changing character of international law, especially in light of 
phenomena such as the creation of the United Nations (UN) to 
formalize a constitutional order of multilateralism and global 
cooperation, and the introduction of a normative foundation of peace 
and security for that order. Related to these phenomena, and 
contributing to among the most radical changes in the character of 
international law over the past century, is the development of an 
 
 1. See CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN 
NATIONS (2005). 
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international human rights regime. The growth of this regime takes 
international law beyond its traditional focus on the rights and duties 
of states, establishes an international legal competency over matters 
once deemed within the exclusive domain of states, and provides 
individuals and other non-state actors access, albeit limited, to 
avenues of international legal process. 
The remarks that follow summarize how the claims of indigenous 
peoples have not only taken advantage of changes in the character of 
international law but have also contributed to those changes, 
particularly in the area of human rights. These changes are beneficial 
not just for indigenous peoples themselves but the humanity more 
broadly. Part I describes the nature of disparate international legal 
arguments employed by indigenous peoples and how those arguments 
have tended toward a human rights discourse. Part II discusses 
specific ways in which the indigenous human rights discourse has 
contributed to the evolution of international human rights law. 
I. TWO FRAMEWORKS OF ARGUMENT USED BY ADVOCATES 
There have been significant advances in international law in favor 
of indigenous peoples over the last two to three decades. These 
advances are largely the result of indigenous peoples’ own resilient 
efforts, both domestically and through international channels. 
Without the resilient efforts by indigenous peoples themselves—
people from the grass roots, their leaders, and their elders—these 
advances would not have occurred. There are two principal 
frameworks of argument used by advocates in the effort to use 
international law in favor of indigenous peoples: the states rights 
framework and the human rights framework. Of these two the human 
rights framework is that which has yielded the most favorable results 
for indigenous peoples over the last several decades. 
A. The States Rights Framework 
One strain of argument has been within the classical state-centered 
framework of international law developed in Europe from the 
seventeenth century onward, along with the institution of the modern 
state. Within this frame of argument, indigenous peoples have been 
referred to as “nations” and identified as having attributes of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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“sovereignty” that predate and, at least to some extent, should trump 
the sovereignty of states that now assert power over them. The 
rhetoric of nationhood is used to posit indigenous peoples as states, or 
something like states, within a post-Westphalian world of separate, 
mutually exclusive political communities. Advocates for indigenous 
peoples point to a history in which “original” sovereignty of 
indigenous communities over defined territories has been 
illegitimately taken from them or suppressed. The rules of 
international law that developed in the nineteenth century relating to 
the acquisition and transfer of territory by and among states are 
invoked to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the assault on indigenous 
sovereignty.  
While appealing to many, this strain of argument must confront 
international law’s strong historical doctrinal tendency, precisely at 
its height in the nineteenth century, to view as unqualified for 
statehood non-European indigenous peoples and instead to favor the 
consolidation of power over them by the European states and their 
colonial offspring. This argument is also strongly resisted by 
contemporary international norms of state sovereignty, which have 
survived robustly from historical doctrine and through existing 
political configurations that favor the sovereignty of already widely 
recognized states to the exclusion of any competing sovereignty. 
B. The Human Rights Framework 
The second strain of argument used by indigenous rights 
advocates over the last few decades centers around the international 
system’s embrace of human rights. Indigenous peoples have seized 
upon the institutional and normative regime of human rights that was 
brought within the fold of international law in the aftermath of World 
War II and the adoption of the UN Charter. Much like the moral 
discourse engaged in by pre-nineteenth-century theorists who are 
associated with the early development of international law and who 
questioned the legality of colonial patterns, the contemporary human 
rights discourse has the welfare of human beings as its subject and is 
concerned only secondarily, if at all, with the interests of sovereign 
entities. Within the human rights framework, indigenous peoples are 
groups of human beings with fundamental human rights concerns that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/7
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deserve attention. Historical events are indeed relevant, but that 
relevance is measured as the extent to which history accounts for the 
conditions of present day oppression and inequities that affect the 
lives of indigenous human beings and their communities. 
Responding to indigenous peoples’ demands is a human rights 
imperative that is now widely recognized within the international 
system. With this recognition has come a sustained level of 
international institutional activity focused upon indigenous peoples’ 
concerns and a corresponding body of norms that build upon long-
standing human rights precepts. This regime is in tension with 
notions of state sovereignty that continue as central to the 
international system and that generally blunt international concern 
over human rights; it also challenges the human rights system’s 
traditional focus on the rights of individuals rather than on the 
collective rights of groups. Nonetheless, an indigenous rights regime 
has developed and it continues to evolve within international law’s 
human rights program in ways that are in some measure favorable to 
indigenous peoples’ demands. 
II. FOUR FRONTS OF CHANGE 
Indigenous peoples are not just prompting changes in international 
law, in particular human rights law, that are focused on their 
demands; they are forging changes in fundamental aspects of the 
international legal system that apply more broadly. These changes 
can be seen along the following four fronts.  
A. The Move Toward Collective Rights 
Indigenous peoples have helped forge new ground within the 
human rights regime of international law by moving it to embrace 
collective human rights. Until recently, the focus of the international 
human rights regime has been almost entirely on the rights of the 
individual against the state, without much attention to the collective 
and associational dimensions of human existence beyond the state. 
Bypassing the individual/state dichotomy of rights and duties, 
indigenous peoples have claimed and articulated their human rights 
in terms of group or collective rights. In multiple written and oral 
statements to international audiences, indigenous leaders and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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representatives have provided lucid explanations and illustrations, 
detailing the convincing justifications for collective human rights that 
have seemingly eluded the academic elite. The international system is 
increasingly embracing the ideal of collective rights for indigenous 
peoples and not just the individual rights of members of indigenous 
communities. In doing so, the international system has acclimated 
itself to collective rights in a way that has potentially broad 
implications beyond simply the context of indigenous peoples.  
Existing and proposed international written instruments have 
affirmed the collective rights of indigenous peoples. Already one 
international treaty, International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Convention Number 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (“the 
Convention”),2 affirms an array of rights belonging to “indigenous 
peoples” and not just rights belonging to individuals who happen to 
be digenous. In the Convention a savings clause is attached to the 
usage of the term “peoples” to avoid implications regarding self-
determination, but that in no way undermines the collective nature of 
the rights affirmed.3 The titleholders of rights within this convention 
are peoples; that means indigenous groups are deemed to have 
collective rights in relation to their lands, the maintenance and 
development of their cultures, their own institutions of self-
governance, and their own laws and customs. This multilateral treaty 
is binding on nearly every country in the Western Hemisphere. 
(Among the exceptions are the United States and Canada, which have 
not ratified the treaty.) Likewise, collective human rights are 
articulated in both the draft of the UN declaration on the rights of 
indigenous peoples and the proposed Organization of American 
States’ (OAS) declaration on indigenous rights.4 These proposed 
declarations affirm a series of rights of indigenous peoples, including 
the same kind of rights affirmed by the Convention, though in much 
 
 2. International Labor Organization, Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, available at http://www.uhchr.ch/html/ 
menu3/b/62.htm (entered into force Sept. 5, 1990). 
 3. Id. art. 1, § 3. 
 4. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, 
Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994); Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 1333d Sess., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. (1997).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/7
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more sweeping terms. It is therefore likely that these declarations, 
once approved, will provide greater recognition for indigenous 
peoples’ collective rights than the Convention.  
Also relevant is the practice of important international human 
rights bodies, including the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, each of which has 
referred to indigenous “peoples” as holders or beneficiaries of rights. 
Although many states have resisted usage of the term “peoples” 
without the kind of qualifier that appears in the Convention, that 
resistance generally indicates opposition toward a recognition of 
indigenous collective rights. The trend that can be seen among states 
participating in international discussions about indigenous rights is to 
accord legal entitlements to indigenous peoples as collective entities. 
This international practice is also consistent with the trend in the 
domestic laws of virtually every state that admits to having 
indigenous groups within its borders, including virtually all of the 
American states.  
Important with regard to collective rights are recent decisions of 
the inter-American human rights institutions in the cases concerning 
the Awas Tingni community in Nicaragua, the Western Shoshone 
people in the United States, and the Maya people in Belize.5 These 
decisions each explicitly affirm the collective rights of indigenous 
peoples over their lands and resources on the basis of international 
legal instruments that only recognize individual rights. The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights interpreted individual rights, such as the right 
to property, in the context of indigenous peoples’ claims. These 
institutions held that property rights arise not just within state legal 
systems, but also within the traditional land-tenure systems of 
indigenous peoples. These rights arise from the collective interaction 
 
 5. See Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2002 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001); Mary and Carrie Dann, Case 11.140, Inter-Am 
C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002); Case of Maya Indigenous 
Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 
40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2004). 
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of indigenous communities and their members, and are therefore 
collective rights. 
These and other developments in international law indicate a 
move toward the recognition of the collective rights of indigenous 
peoples within the human rights framework of international law. This 
important development in the structure of international human rights 
law has relevance beyond simply the context of indigenous peoples 
because it moves the international human rights system beyond the 
individual/state dichotomy that has framed dominant understandings 
about rights and duties under international law. 
B. The Softening of State Sovereignty 
A second, related way in which indigenous peoples have helped 
change international law has to do with state sovereignty, which is 
considered one of the bedrock doctrines of international law. The 
doctrine of sovereignty traditionally has shielded states from scrutiny 
over matters that are deemed to be within the realm of their domestic 
concern. A good deal of scholarly commentary has been devoted to 
identifying and explaining a weakening of the sovereignty shield over 
the last several decades. This weakening is attributed substantially to 
the international human rights regime that has developed since the 
adoption of the UN Charter and that imposes, typically in favor of the 
individual, external limitations on the exercise of state authority in 
the domestic realm. Indigenous peoples’ demands, which have been 
deployed through the human rights regime, are resulting in a more 
radical altering of the state sovereignty norm than the alteration 
brought about by the internationalization of individual rights.  
The assertion of such group rights challenges the primacy and 
sphere of state governing authority in a much more fundamental 
sense than classical individual rights. International norms have 
developed and are further evolving to uphold the asserted group 
rights manifested in the Convention and the drafts of the UN’s and 
OAS’s declarations on indigenous rights. The weakening of the state 
sovereignty shield in this regard is dramatically evident in recent 
proceedings before the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee, and CERD in which states 
have been called upon to answer for their promotion of natural 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/7
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resource development or land administration schemes regarding lands 
claimed by indigenous peoples. These cases involve the assertion of 
claims of indigenous peoples over natural resources on their 
traditional lands.  
For example, in the cases concerning the Mayas in Belize, the 
Awas Tingni community in Nicaragua, and the Western Shoshone in 
the United States, the main defense of the states concerned was that 
the administration of lands and natural resources are matters that fall 
within the sovereign discretion of the state. Belize, Nicaragua, and 
the United States either explicitly or tacitly argued that it is up to the 
state to decide how to distribute land, how to manage land, and how 
to manage the natural resources. However, in the Awas Tingni case 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, joined by the 
Inter-American Court in the Awas Tingni case, disagreed with that 
position and saw that these questions were legitimate subjects of 
international concern. The Commission affirmed the collective rights 
of indigenous peoples over their lands and resources and held that the 
United States, Belize and Nicaragua should adjust their laws and 
policies regarding the administration of these lands and resources. 
These cases illustrate how the international human rights system’s 
embrace of indigenous rights is pushing toward a softening of the 
doctrine of state sovereignty.  
C. Evolution of the Norm of Self-Determination 
A third, and again related, area of change has to do with the 
concept of self-determination. Self-determination is affirmed as a 
principle in the UN Charter and as a right of “all peoples” in the 
international human rights covenants. Much scholarly effort has gone 
into trying to explain the meaning of the right of all peoples to self-
determination as a human right in the context of an international legal 
order that presumptively upholds the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and political unity of states. Typically, self-determination has been 
understood to mean, in its fullest sense, a right to independent 
statehood. Hence the central focus of inquiry has been on identifying 
the necessarily limited universe of groups that are entitled to become 
independent states if they so chose. A premise underlying this 
approach is that the state is the highest form of self-determination for 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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cultural or national communities. This premise is of course subject to 
question, if only because of accelerating developments over the last 
several decades by which the importance of the state has diminished 
in light of the growth of both local and transnational spheres of 
community and authority. 
In pressing their demands internationally, indigenous peoples 
have pointedly undermined the premise of the state as the highest and 
most liberating form of human association. Indigenous peoples are 
seen, and for the most part see themselves, as different from but not 
inferior to states. The model that is emerging from the interplay of 
indigenous demands and the authoritative responses to those demands 
is one that sees indigenous peoples as simultaneously distinct from, 
and yet parts of, the states within which they live, as well as part of 
other units of social and political interaction that might include 
indigenous federations or transnational associations. Within this 
model, self-determination is achieved not by independent statehood, 
but by the consensual development of context-specific arrangements 
that uphold for indigenous peoples both spheres of autonomy 
commensurate with relevant cultural patterns and rights of 
participation in the political processes of the states in which they live. 
Professor Erica-Irene Daes, the previous, long-time chair of the UN 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, has observed: 
This [process] might best be described as a kind of “belated 
State-building,” through which indigenous peoples are able to 
join with all the other peoples that make up the State on 
mutually-agreed and just terms, after many years of isolation 
and exclusion. This does not mean that assimilation of 
indigenous individuals as citizens like all others, but the 
recognition and incorporation of distinct peoples in the fabric 
of the State, on agreed terms.6 
A new conception of self-determination is emerging around 
indigenous peoples’ claim to self-determination that applies to 
 
 6. Erica-Irene A. Daes, Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Explanatory Note 
Concerning the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at para. 26 (1993), 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english (follow “Search” hyperlink; type “Erica-Irene A. 
Daes” and “19 July 1993” in the search engine). 
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claimants of self-determination across the globe beyond the specific 
context of indigenous peoples. This new conception of self-
determination, reflected in the preamble of the UN Draft Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, makes clear that the right 
affirmed is not the right of indigenous peoples to secede from the 
states within which they live. Rather, the new conception of self-
determination recognizes the freedom of individuals and groups to 
form associations and to collectively pursue their own destinies under 
conditions of equality within the framework of the states within 
which they live.  
The kind of particular arrangements needed to allow for this 
conception self-determination will necessarily vary from case to case 
and adapt to the specific context of individual indigenous groups. For 
example, the Yanomami of the Amazon region of Brazil and the 
Navajo people of southwestern United States exist under very 
different economic, political, and geographic situations; therefore, 
these groups will necessarily develop different kinds of structures to 
accommodate their right of self-determination. Nevertheless, the 
underlying norm reflecting the fundamental right of these groups is 
the same: it is the right of each one to be in control of its own destiny. 
This conception of self-determination assumes a more nuanced 
character by taking into account the interdependencies that exist 
among and between indigenous communities and the larger societies 
within which they live. This substantial innovation in the doctrine of 
self-determination moves beyond the classic understanding of self-
determination as wedded to a right of independent statehood, and has 
implications far beyond the context of indigenous peoples. 
D. The Role of Non-State Actors 
Finally, another development promoted by the emergence of 
indigenous peoples within the contemporary international legal 
system has to do with the role of non-state actors. Actors other than 
states have increasing influence within the international legal system, 
particularly its human rights regime. Individuals themselves are 
rights holders and have some access to the international system in 
order to claim those rights. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
like Amnesty International influence the development of international 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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law through advocacy efforts and consultative status with the UN’s 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and its subsidiary bodies. 
Labor unions also have significant access to the international human 
rights system, especially through the ILO. Private corporations are 
increasingly scrutinized by international agencies and NGOs, and are 
thus subjects of international concern. Therefore, the classic 
understanding of the subjects of international law is breaking down. 
Contemporary international legal discourse does not only involve the 
examination of the rights of states and the duties of states. Rather, 
there are multiple actors and an increasing number of rights holders 
in the modern international system. 
Indigenous peoples are among the numerous non-state actors that 
have managed to take advantage of openings in the international 
system and forge new ones in order to participate in and influence 
decision-making processes that extend into the international arena. 
For over two decades, representatives of indigenous peoples have 
been appearing before UN human rights bodies in increasing 
numbers and with increasing frequency. Indigenous peoples have 
enhanced their access to these bodies as several organizations 
representative of indigenous groups have achieved official 
consultative status with the ECOSOC. In response to indigenous 
peoples’ efforts in particular, new institutions and programs have 
developed that are providing them unique avenues of access to the 
international system. Most notably among these are the UN’s 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, the Special Rapporteur 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, 
and the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Indigenous peoples 
and their organizations have direct access to these agencies, and they 
appear before them in their public sessions to make written or oral 
submissions. Additionally, eight of the sixteen members of the 
Permanent Forum are named by the ECOSOC President in 
consultation with indigenous peoples, and this has resulted in those 
eight being from indigenous constituencies.  
The increasing access of indigenous peoples to the international 
system is especially noteworthy in at least two respects. First, without 
any political influence to speak of, indigenous peoples have been 
successful in using the language and methods of human rights to 
advance their demands. Grounding their demands in generally 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/7
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applicable human rights principles, they have used their access to the 
international system to articulate a vision of themselves different 
from that previously advanced and acted upon by dominant sectors, 
and they have greatly influenced the international agenda of activities 
that has proceeded in response to those demands. In a relatively short 
time they have managed to shift prevailing attitudes away from a 
norm of assimilation toward one of respect for indigenous cultures 
and group identity. Even though this shift has not progressed 
sufficiently to entirely satisfy most indigenous groups, and its 
implementation on the ground has been slow to follow, the shift is 
nonetheless clearly perceptible in the collective and individual 
utterances by states and other actors, and in newly developed or still 
developing written instruments. 
Second, indigenous peoples appear to be gaining recognition as 
having a unique or sui generis status among non-state actors within 
the international arena. Associated with this unique status is an 
enhanced level of participation. Indigenous peoples are unlike 
ordinary nongovernmental organizations in that indigenous peoples 
are not simply groups organized around particular interests. Rather, 
indigenous peoples are by definition longstanding communities with 
historically rooted cultures and distinct political and social 
institutions. They seek to have a presence in their own right as 
peoples in the international arena and not just as representatives of a 
segment of so-called civil society. As already noted, within the UN 
and other international institutions various extraordinary mechanisms 
have been devised to allow representatives of indigenous peoples to 
express their concerns and participate in discussions that affect them.  
Indigenous peoples are unique among non-state actors. By gaining 
a foothold in the international system, they are a significant force in 
making that system less state-centered and more centered on human 
beings in their multiple relevant configurations, a phenomenon with 
broader implications.  
CONCLUSION 
Developments generated by indigenous peoples through a 
discourse of human rights are having identifiable impacts on 
international law, particularly human rights law, with implications for 
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the larger international community. These developments are breaking 
new ground on issues concerning collective rights, state sovereignty, 
self-determination, and the role of non-state actors, with a central 
feature being a challenge to the state as the sole or primary means of 
locating power and community. Having asserted themselves in the 
international arena, indigenous peoples have pursued a vision of a 
normative universe that stands against forces of the kind that have 
wreaked havoc on indigenous societies throughout history. In doing 
so, indigenous communities are helping to bring about change in the 
international legal order. This change just might help bring about a 
more just and humane world, not only for indigenous peoples but for 
all of humanity.  
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